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EU Law Constraints on intra-EU  
Investment Arbitration? 
Dr Eirik Bjorge, University of Bristol 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The law of the European Union (EU) ‘constitutes a new legal order of international 
law’;1 it is its ‘own legal system’,2 representing a ‘constitutional legal order’ with its 
own coherence and logic.3 One concomitant of this development has been that the EU 
organs jealously guard the autonomy of EU law.4 With the accession to the EU of the 
Central and Eastern European States almost 200 BITs became intra-EU and the 
possibility of intra-EU proceedings under the European Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)5 
greatly increased.6 The EU, through the European Commission, has taken a tough 
stance on intra-EU investment arbitration, essentially seeing intra-EU investment 
arbitration as an anomaly to be combatted with all means.7 
                                                     
1 Case 26–62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
2 Case 6–64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585. 
3 See e.g. E Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 47 AJIL 1; 
JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1990–1991) 100 YLJ 2403; M Rasmussen, 
‘Revolutionizing European Law: A History of the Van Gend en Loos Judgment’ (2014) 12 I•CON 136; 
V Lowe, ‘The Law of Treaties; Or, Should this Book Exist?’ in in CJ Tams, A Tzanakopoulos, and A 
Zimmermann (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties (Elgar 2014) 3, 5–7. Cf, however, F 
Berman, ‘Community Law and International Law: How Far Does Either Belong to the Other?’ in The 
Clifford Chance Lectures Volume I: Bridging the Channel (ed Markesinis, 1996). 
4 See e.g. Opinion C–2/13; B Stirn, Towards a European Public Law (E Bjorge tr, OUP 2017) Ch 3. 
5 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95. 
6 J Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Investment Protection and EU Law’ (2012) 15 JIEL 85. 
7 See the views of the EU made known and referred to in cases such as e.g. Oostergetel & Laurentius v 
Slovakia, UNCITRAL ad hoc Arbitration, 30 April 2010; Electrabel v Hungary, ICSID Case No 
ARB/07/19, 30 November 2012; Achmea BV (formerly known as Eureko BV) v Slovakia, PCA Case No 
2008–13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability, and Suspension, 26 October 2010; European American 
Investment Bank AG (Austria) (‘EURAM’) v Slovak Republic, PCA Case No 2010-17, Award on 
Jurisdiction, 22 October 2012. 
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Article 344 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)8 
provides that ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for therein.’ This provision does not provide for an absolute monopoly for the 
CJEU over the interpretation and application of EU law: the CJEU has no monopoly, 
for the simple reason that courts and tribunals throughout the Member States of the EU 
apply EU law daily. There is a monopoly only over the authoritative interpretation or 
application of EU law. It applies only to inter-State disputes, that is, disputes submitted 
by the States Members, and not to disputes between a private investor on the one hand 
and a Member State on the other.9 But Article 344 would nevertheless, so far as EU law 
is concerned, prevent State–State dispute settlement between Member States as to the 
scope of EU law under an investment agreement to which both the EU and the Member 
States are parties.10 Indeed Opinion 2/13 seems to lay claim to a broad monopoly on 
the part of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).11 In that regard the 
European Commission on 29 September 2016 sent a formal request to Austria, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden, asking these Member States to terminate 
their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, arguing that since the enlargement of the 
EU such extra reassurances as to investment protection are supererogatory, as EU rules 
in the single market, such as the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital, 
already provide a legal framework for cross-border investments.12  
 
                                                     
8 Consolidated versions of the treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, [2016] OJ C 202 (TFEU). 
9 See Case C-284/16 Slovak Republic v Achmea BV (pending before the CJEU). 
10 S Schill, ‘Opinion 2/13—The End for Dispute Settlement in EU Trade and Investment Agreements?’ 
(2015) 16 The Journal of World Investment & trade 379, 384. 
11 . Opinion C–2/13 paras 182–86. 
12 See European Commission—Fact Sheet, 29 September 2016, para 6.  
 3 
In the view of the EU, it follows from the primacy and autonomy of European 
Union law that no Member State can be directly or indirectly involved in intra-EU 
investment arbitrations. That would breach the fundamental elements of the European 
Union legal order and its judicial system, as bilateral investment treaties deal with 
subjects which are taken to fall squarely within the scope of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union.13 
The Commission distinguishes between extra-EU BITs and intra-EU BITs; its 
concerns about extra-EU BITs relate to questions of treaty making competence and 
incompatibility with mandatory EU law relating to investment, capital movements, and 
payments.14 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU enjoys, as a part of 
the common commercial policy,15 exclusive competence in respect of foreign direct 
investment. The Commission does not take issue with third party arbitration 
mechanisms set out in these BITs entered into with non-EU countries.16 The 
Commission’s concerns with intra-EU BITs, however, relates to the compatibility of 
such BITs with the mandatory provisions of EU law and are or a different order 
altogether.17 This argument goes also for the ECT, which together with the Protocol on 
Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects,18 sets up a multilateral regime 
for energy co-operation, with a view to accelerate economic recovery in Eastern Europe 
by way of co-operation in the energy sector.19 
                                                     
13 e.g. rules regulating aspects of foreign investment activity, including for post-establishment treatment 
and operation, that is, rules on right of establishment and on capital movements and transfers: see 
especially Part Three, Title IV, Ch 2 of the TFEU, Arts 49–55; and Ch 4, Arts 63–66. See European 
Commission Observations, 13 October 2011, in EURAM v Slovak Republic, p 1–2. 
14 Eureko v Czech Republic, PCA Case No 2008–13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability, and 
Suspension, 26 October 2010, para 176. 
15 TFEU Art 207(1), Art 3(1)(e). 
16 Eureko v Czech Republic, PCA Case No 2008–13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability, and 
Suspension, 26 October 2010, para 176. 
17 ibid para 177. 
18 17 December 1994, 2081 UNTS 3. 
19 See J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 336. 
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According to the European Commission, intra-EU BITs amount to an ‘anomaly 
within the EU internal market’; there is, in the view of the Commission, at least a partial 
overlap between the intra-EU BITs and the internal market provisions of the EU, and 
this calls into question the permissibility of the continued existence of intra-EU BITs.20 
It might be asked whether the debate about the role of EU law in intra-EU 
investment disputes is no more than a re-run of the old debate of the alleged primacy 
of domestic law over international law in investment disputes? Many writers, States, 
and Tribunals opposed, for a long time, the idea that international law had a direct role 
to play in the settlement of investment disputes.21 In a classic article from the turn of 
the century Prosper Weil pointed up the ‘ingrained … reluctance [of some] to introduce 
international law in investment relations’.22 For decades there was strong reluctance 
towards what has later come to be known as ‘the internationalization of legal 
investment relations’.23 International law, the argument ran, should not be allowed to 
govern what was argued to be matters for domestic law.24 Judged in that light, the views 
of the European Commission seem to some extent to be a re-run of old arguments; in 
the view of the Commission, international law should not be allowed to govern matters 
which are for EU law. 
                                                     
20 Eureko v Czech Republic, PCA Case No 2008–13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability, and 
Suspension, 26 October 2010, para 177. 
21 See e.g. Serbian Loans (1929) Series A No 20–21, 42 (‘Any contract which is not a contract between 
States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some country. 
The question as to which this law is forms part of that branch of law which is at the present day usually 
described as private international law or the doctrine of the conflict of laws.’); Petroleum Development 
Ltd v The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144, 149; Texaco Overseas Petroleum, Co & California 
Asiatic Oil Co v The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Merits) (1977) 53 ILR 389, 443; AD 
McNair, ‘The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilised Nations’ (1957) 33 BYIL 1; GR 
Delaume, ‘The Proper Law of State Contracts Revisited’ (1997) 12 ICSID Review—FILJ 1. 
22 P Weil, ‘The State, the Foreign Investor, and International Law: The No Longer Stormy Relationship 
of a Ménage À Trois’ (2000) 15 ICSID Review—FILJ 401, 410. 
23 ibid 411. 
24 See the case-law referred to in footnote 21. 
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Going from the specific to the general, from the bilateral to the multilateral, the 
attention is turned first, in Part 2, to intra-EU BITs and then, in Part 3, to the ECT, 
focusing on the question of so-called disconnection clauses. Part 4 turns to whether 
anything can be gleaned from other more or less self-contained ‘constitutional’ systems 
of international law, that is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)25 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).26 Part 5 deals 
with the question of whether it is not the case that, in common with any other norm of 
international law, the argument could be made that an intra-EU BIT or the ECT should 
be interpreted against the background of other international law, and the EU law is no 
less other international law than are other international norms? The concept of 
jurisdiction is key throughout, as the validity of the bilateral investment treaty invoked 
in arbitration is a pre-requisite for the tribunal’s ability legitimately to assert 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
2. Intra-EU BITs 
As adumbrated above, the EU takes the view that intra-EU BITs have been terminated. 
One strand of this argument is based on Article 59 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.27 Article 59 provides that: 
 
A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later 
treaty relating to the same subject-matter and (a) it appears from the later treaty 
or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should be 
                                                     
25 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3.  
26 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222. 
27 22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
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governed by that treaty; or (b) the provisions of the later treaty are so far 
incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable 
of being applied at the same time. 
 
Could it be held, in respect of countries that joined the EU after having signed a BIT 
with a EU Member, but before the Treaty of Lisbon, that the accession to the EU treaties 
terminated the BIT? This argument has consistently failed, and rightly so, for a number 
of reasons. One is that the ECT or a BIT does not relate to the same subject matter as 
the pre-2009 EU Treaties,28 and that it would scarcely be right to say that the States 
Parties to the BIT have manifested a clear common intention to terminate the BIT—
which Respondents have tried to infer.29 Investment tribunals followed this approach 
and therefore refused to uphold the jurisdictional objections raised by the Respondent 
State and supported by the Commission. 
Tribunals such as the one in Achmea BV  v Slovakia have not accepted the 
arguments of Respondent States and of the European Commission that the BIT at issue 
was terminated and/or superseded.30 In Oostergetel & Laurentius v Slovakia, where the 
Respondent had argued that the BIT had been terminated upon Slovakia’s accession to 
the EU, the Tribunal held that the BIT was not terminated and that ‘the Tribunal does 
not see any direct conflict between the BIT and the relevant EU law provisions that 
would impede it from applying the two sets of legal norms simultaneously, should such 
a need arise’.31 Accession to the EU in 2004 was ‘without prejudice to the continuing 
                                                     
28 European American Investment Bank AG (Austria) (‘EURAM’) v Slovak Republic, PCA Case No 
2010-17, Award on Jurisdiction, para 185. 
29 ibid para 194. 
30 Achmea BV (formerly known as Eureko BV) v Slovakia, PCA Case No 2008–13, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Arbitrability, and Suspension, 26 October 2010, para 218. 
31 Oostergetel & Laurentius v Slovakia, UNCITRAL ad hoc Arbitration, 30 April 2010, para 74. 
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application and validity of the existent BITs’.32 Nowhere does the Accession Treaty say 
that it governs the matter of bilateral investment protection. Against this background it 
seems, as a matter of principle, a difficult argument to make to say that the mere fact 
that a State joins the EU should be taken to mean that it intended to terminate all its 
intra-EU BITs. General de Gaulle is reported to have quipped that ‘treaties are like 
roses and young girls; they last while they last’:33 but, as James Crawford has observed, 
the reality of the matter is that ‘treaties are enduring instruments, not easily disposed 
of’.34 
 
 
3. The ECT and the Question of Disconnection Clauses 
It is common practice for the framers of a treaty to include, if they so wish, a provision 
to the effect that an existing treaty shall not be affected.35 According to Committee of 
Legal Advisers in International Law (CADHI): 
 
[t]he term disconnection clause’ is commonly used to refer to a provision in a 
multilateral treaty allowing certain parties to the treaty not to apply the treaty in 
full or in part in their mutual relations, while other parties remain free to invoke 
the treaty fully in their relations with these parties. It is not a term of art in 
international law, and the legal and practical effect of each provision depends 
upon its wording and the context in which it appears.36 
                                                     
32 ibid para 83. 
33 Time, 12 July 1963. 
34 J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 377. 
35 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, CUP 2013) 197–99. 
36 CADHI, Report on the So-Called ‘Disconnetion Clause’. 
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States sometimes make provision in multilateral treaties for accommodating possible 
conflicting treaties.37 Article 104 of the NAFTA, entitled ‘Relation to Environmental 
and Conservation Agreements’, does this, stipulating that a number of environmental 
and conservation agreements shall, in the event of any inconsistency between the 
NAFTA and the agreements, ‘prevail to the extent of the inconsistency’. As Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris have pointed out, there has in particular been an 
increase in the use of such ‘disconnection clauses’ in multilateral agreements to which 
the EU is a party. The aim of such clauses is to ensure that the EU rules will continue 
to apply amongst the EU Member States, leaving unaffected the relationships and 
corresponding rights and obligations between EU Member States and non-Members 
that are all parties to the treaty.38 Definitions of disconnection clauses vary.39 
Signed at Prüm on 27 May 2005, the Prüm Convention or Schengen III 
Agreement, a treaty on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation in combating 
terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration,40 has a disconnection clause in 
respect of EU law in its Article 47(1). The provision is in the following terms: ‘The 
provisions of this Convention shall apply only in so far as they are compatible with 
European Union law.’ 
Similarly, Article 27 of the 1988 Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters provides that: ‘Notwithstanding the rules of the present 
                                                     
37 M Mendelson, ‘Investment and BITs in Clinical Isolation? Conflicting Legal Obligations of Host 
States’ (2009) 24 ICSID Review—FILJ 489, 491. 
38 M Fitzmaurice & P Merkouris, ‘Uniformity versus specialization: The quest for a uniform law of inter-
State treaties’ in CJ Tams, A Tzanakopoulos, and A Zimmermann (eds), Research Handbook on the Law 
of Treaties (Elgar 2014) 364–65 
39 e.g. ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law’, Report of the ILC Study Group, finalized by M Koskenniemi, Chairman of the 
Study Group, A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), paras 289–94. 
40 2617 UNTS 3 
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Convention, those Parties which are members of the European Economic Community 
shall apply in their mutual relations the common rules in force in that Community’.41 
What about the ECT, whose relationship with the EU is one which no doubt 
will have weighed on the minds of its framers? The ECT, possibly at the insistence of 
Norway, does indeed have a disconnection clause—not in respect of the EU Treaties, 
but in respect of the Svalbard Treaty,42 in Annex 2(1), which provides that: ‘[i]n the 
event of a conflict between the treaty concerning Spitsbergen of 9 February 1920 (the 
Svalbard Treaty) and the Energy Charter Treaty, the treaty concerning Spitsbergen shall 
prevail to the extent of the conflict’. According to the time-hallowed maxim expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, that which is omitted is understood to be excluded. In the 
present instance, when an EU disconnection clause was omitted by the parties—and 
one in respect of the Svalbard Treaty was indeed included—it must be understood 
wholly to be excluded. The parties should therefore be regarded as having implicitly 
agreed that in no way should EU law prevail in case of inconsistency: expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius. In The Wimbledon, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
famously relied on the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule, observing in 
connection with the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 that: ‘If the conditions of access to the 
canal were also to be modified in the event of a conflict between two Powers remaining 
at peace with the German Empire, the treaty would not have failed to say so. It has not 
said so and this omission was no doubt intentional.’43  
The point is, in other words, that one should draw inferences from the fact that 
the EU treaties were not mentioned in the way that was the Svalbard Treaty. In the 
                                                     
41 25 January 1988, 1966 UNTS 215. 
42 9 February 1920, 2 LNTS 8. See RE Fife, ‘L’objet et le but du traité du Spitzberg (Svalbard) et le droit 
de la mer’ in La mer et son droit—Mélanges offerts à Laurent Lucchini et Jean-Pierre Quéneudec 
(Pedone 2003) 239.  
43 The SS Wimbledon (1923) PCIJ Series A No 1, p 23. 
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recent Questions of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Nicaragua v Colombia) 
the International Court, with explicit reference to Wimbledon, sounded a caution in 
relation to this type of argument, which it called not by its traditional name, expressio 
unius, but instead an a contrario reading. The Court observed: ‘Such an interpretation 
is only warranted, however, when it is appropriate in light of the text of all the 
provisions concerned, their context and the object and purpose of the treaty. Moreover, 
even where an a contrario interpretation is justified, it is important to determine 
precisely what inferences its application requires in any given case.’44 It is necessary, 
therefore, to be cautious, and context-orientated, in relying on an expressio unius or a 
contrario argument. Nevertheless, it seems that even on a context-orientated approach 
it can be assumed that, another disconnection clause having in fact been included, the 
parties can safely be said not to have intended to imply a disconnection clause in the 
ECT in respect of the EU Treaties. 
In fact, the ECT contains a provision which specifically deals with other 
international law, and it does so in a particular way. Such a contextual exercise might 
take us to Article 16 ECT, which provides that: ‘Where two or more Contracting Parties 
have entered into a prior international agreement, or enter into a subsequent 
international agreement, whose terms in either case concern the subject matter of Part 
III of this Treaty’ nothing in Part III or V of the ECT shall derogate from such 
agreements and, vice versa, nothing in the other agreement shall derogate from Part III 
or V of the ECT where, and this is crucial, ‘any such provision is more favourable to 
the Investor or Investment’. 
                                                     
44 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 
Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Preliminary Objections), Judgment 
of 17 March 2016, para 35. 
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That is what in the law of treaties is called ‘mobile priority’, another example 
of which is found in Article 53 ECHR, which provides for the priority of the human 
rights instrument offering the wider protection to the individual.45 This kind of 
disconnection clause operates only to heighten protection for the claimant: for the 
investor under the ECT, for the individual under a treaty system such as the ECHR. 
 
 
4. The External Relations of Other ‘Constitutional’ Regimes of 
International Law 
Examples could be given from conventional regimes that, in common with EU law, to 
a certain extent consider themselves to be of a constitutional nature. First, the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),46 famously branded ‘a 
Constitution for the Oceans’,47 sets out in its Part XV rules for the resolution of disputes 
between States Parties arising out of the interpretation or application of the convention. 
Following the constitutional approach, some have argued that the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) goes too far in taking into account other international 
law than the UNCLOS.48 
It follows from Article 287(1) that a State may, when signing, ratifying, or 
acceding to UNCLOS, make a declaration choosing, amongst other options, ad hoc 
                                                     
45 R Kolb, The Law of Treaties (Edward Elgar 2016) 188. 
46 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3.  
47 TTB Koh, ‘A Constitution for the Oceans: Statement of Ambassador Tommy TB Koh, President of 
the Conference, at its final session in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 11 December 1982’ in The Law of the Sea: 
Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1983) xxxiii, 
xxxvii (‘We worked not only to promote our individual national interests but also in pursuit of our 
common dream of writing a constitution for the oceans’); H Corell, ‘Speech Delivered at the Inaugural 
Session of the Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, 18 October 1996’ (1996–1997) 1 International Tribunal 
of the Law of the Sea Yearbook 1, 13. Also: M Johnson & B van Voorst, ‘A Constitution for the Seas’ 
Time, 8 September 1980. 
48 D Guilfoye & C Miles, ‘Provisional Measures and the MV Arctic Sunrise’ (2014) 108 AJIL 271. 
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arbitration, in accordance with Annex VII of the convention. Annex VII is indeed the 
default means of dispute settlement if a State has not expressed any preference and has 
not entered any reservation or optional exception under Article 298. In connection with 
the first Annex VII arbitration—Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; 
Australia v Japan)49—the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) served as registry; for all other Annex VII arbitrations to date the functions of 
registry have been performed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).50 Instead 
of jealously fighting over jurisdiction, the organs of International Tribunal of the Law 
of the Sea have, through an exchange of letters between its Registrar and the Secretary-
General of the PCA, agreed with the PCA to cooperate in relation to the relevant legal 
and administrative matters, exchanging documents connected with Annex VII disputes 
and exploring other kinds of cooperation in other areas of concern.51 
Secondly—and even more in point—comes the example of the European 
Convention on Human Rights,52 consistently referred to by the European Court of 
Human Rights as ‘a constitutional instrument of European public order’.53 On the one 
hand there is Article 32 and the jurisprudence of the Court applying that provision. 
Article 32 of the ECHR stipulates that the Strasbourg Court has jurisdiction over ‘all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention’. The Court has 
held that ‘it alone is competent to decide on its jurisdiction to interpret and apply the 
Convention and its Protocol (Article 32 of the Convention), in particular with regard to 
                                                     
49 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (2000) 23 RIAA 1. 
50 e.g. MOX Plant (2001) 126 ILR 257; Guyana/Suriname (2007) 139 ILR 566; Barbados v Trinidad 
and Tobago (2006) 139 ILR 449; Chagos Island (Mauritius v United Kingdom) (2015) 162 ILR 1.  
51 See the information on the website of the PCA in this regard: https://pca-
cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/unclos/. 
52 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 
UNTS 222. 
53 e.g. Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 103 ILR 622, para 75. 
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the issue of whether the person in question is an applicant within the meaning of Article 
34 of the Convention and whether the applicant fulfils the requirements of that 
provision’.54 On the other hand there is Article 55 of the Convention, formerly Article 
62, which is in the following terms: 
 
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they will 
not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force between 
them for the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a dispute arising out of 
the interpretation or application of this Convention to a means of settlement 
other than those provided for in this Convention. 
 
As it was explained by Sir Samuel Hoare during the drafting of this provision, a 
consideration that weighed with the drafters was the ‘proliferation of organs with 
tremendous difficulties for the definition of their respective jurisdiction’.55 As 
explained by William Schabas, however, ‘Article 55 does not entirely exclude the 
possibility that human rights issues as well as related matters are addressed in other 
fora’,56 and the Strasbourg organs, including the Court, have taken a broad-minded 
approach to the question. Two examples show this. First regarding the matter of Süd 
Tirol/Alto Adige Italy and Austria, having initially submitted an inter-State application 
to the Commission,57 subsequently reached an agreement, which agreement contained 
a compromissary clause in which the parties agreed to submit disputes not to the 
                                                     
54 Shamayev & Others v Georgia & Russia, no 36378/02, ECHR 2005–III, para 293. 
55 Minutes of the afternoon sitting, 9 June 1950, Travaux préparatoires to the ECHR IV, 124. 
56 W Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2014) 913. Also: E 
Decaux, ‘Article 62’ in LE Pettiti and others (eds), La Convention europeenne des droits de l’homme 
(2nd edn, Economica 1999) 912–13. 
57 (1960) 3 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 168–71. 
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Strasbourg Court but to the International Court of Justice. No Strasbourg organ 
registered any misgivings.58 
Secondly, in the dispute between Georgia and Russia, Georgia relied upon the 
compromissory clause in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination59 in order to bring a case before the International Court of 
Justice. In 2011 the International Court granted a preliminary objection filed by Russia, 
finding that Georgia had failed to exhaust the route of negotiation before seizing the 
Court.60 
During the pendency of the proceeding before the International Court, however, 
Georgia had filed a case before the European Court of Human Rights.61 The rule against 
similar proceedings set out in Article 35 ECHR does not apply to inter-State 
proceedings. As the case before the International Court had been rejected, no problem 
of lis pendens arose: but what of Article 55? The Court did not explicitly touch on 
Article 55.62 Schabas has wisely observed view that: ‘Georgia may well have breached 
article 55 of the Convention, although it is hard to see what consequence this could 
have in judicial proceedings. Jurisdiction before either the International Court of Justice 
or the European Court of Human Rights could not be defeated merely because one of 
the States had failed to respect Article 55 of the Convention.’63 As a matter of principle, 
that view must be correct. It is not that ‘every tribunal is a self-contained system’.64 But 
the question of breach by a party of a treaty not at issue before the ‘tribunal de céans’ 
                                                     
58 See A Fenet, ‘La fin du litige italo–autrichien sur le Haut-Adige-Tyrol du Sud’ (1993) 39 AFDI 357. 
59 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195. 
60 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v Russian Federation) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Rep 2011 p 70. 
61 Georgia v Russia (dec.), no. 38263/08, 13 December 2011. 
62 Georgia v Russia (dec.), no. 38263/08, 13 December 2011, para 79. 
63 W Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2014) 914. 
64 Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) (1995) 105 ILR 419, 458. 
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is on the whole an extraneous matter to the interpretation and application of the treaty 
of which the tribunal is in fact seized. Thus, as regards the jurisdiction of an investment 
tribunal seized of claims based on intra-EU bilateral investment treaties or the ECT, 
jurisdiction cannot be held to be defeated owing to the breach or alleged breach by the 
Respondent State of the rules of another system on international law, in the event EU 
law. 
 
 
5. Assessment 
Of course investment tribunals must be cognizant of the fact that investment law is a 
part of the larger canvas of international law, and that a BIT or the ECT is not to be 
interpreted in a vacuum. As the International Court put it in Interpretation of the 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, no branch of international 
law can be thought to operate ‘in a vacuum’; rather it operates with ‘relation to facts 
and in the context of a wider framework of legal rules of which it forms only a part’.65 
Certain international courts and tribunals have gone far, some have argued too far,66 in 
taking seriously this approach.67 But that approach has certain limits, limits which flow 
                                                     
65 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt ICJ Rep 1980 73, 76 
para 10. See also e.g. The Kronprins Gustav Adolf (1932) 2 RIAA 1246–7; Reparation for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Rep 1949, p 182; Fubini Claim (1959) 29 ILR, p 46; 
Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 57 ILR 200, 217, para 35; Demir & Baykara v Turkey [GC], no. 
34503/97, ECHR 2008, para 71; H Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the 
International Court (1958) 26–31; ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the ILC Study Group, finalized by M 
Koskenniemi, Chairman of the Study Group, A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), paras 46–222, which drew on C 
McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’ 
(2005) 43 ICLQ 281; M Andenas, ‘Reassertion and Transformation: From Fragmentation to 
Convergence in International Law’ (2015) 46 Georgetown JIL 685; P Webb, International Judicial 
Integration and Fragmentation (2013) Ch 5. 
66 F Berman, ‘Treaty “Interpretation” in a Judicial Context’ (2004) 29 YJIL 315; D Guilfoye & C Miles, 
‘Provisional Measures and the MV Arctic Sunrise’ (2014) 108 AJIL 271. 
67 Oil Platforms (Iran v USA), ICJ Rep 2003, p 182–3; Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v Russian 
Federation), ITLOS Case No 22 (Provisional Measures, 22 November 2013); Hassan v United Kingdom 
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from the treaty to be interpreted. This is exemplified by the distinguished Tribunal68 in 
Indus Waters Kishenganga (Pakistan v India).69 The Kishenganga Tribunal, in its 
interpretation of the Indian–Pakistani Indus Waters Treaty and Annexures, underscored 
that in interpreting the treaty ‘principles of international environmental law must be 
taken into account’.70 However, Paragraph 29 of Annexure G to the Indus Waters 
Treaty made clear that: 
 
the law to be applied by the Court shall be this Treaty and, whenever, 
necessary for its interpretation or application, but only to the extent 
necessary for that purpose, the following in the order in which they are 
listed: (a) International conventions establishing rules which are 
expressly recognized by the Parties; (b) Customary international law 
 
Thus the Tribunal noted that ‘the place of customary international law in the 
interpretation and application of the Indus Waters Treaty remains subject to Paragraph 
29’; ‘this Treaty expressly limits the extent to which the Court may have recourse to, 
and apply, sources of law beyond the Treaty itself’.71 The Tribunal concluded that:  
 
if customary international law were applied not to circumscribe, but to 
negate rights expressly granted in the Treaty, this would no longer be 
                                                     
(2014) 161 ILR 524, para 77. 
68 The Tribunal consisted of: Sir Frank Berman; Professor Howard S Weather; Professor Lucius Caflisch; 
Professor Jan Paulsson; Judge Bruno Simma; Judge Peter Tomka; Judge Stephen M Schwebel, 
Chairman. 
69 Indus Waters Kishenganga (Pakistan v India) (Final Award) (2013) 157 ILR 362. 
70 Indus Waters Kishenganga (Pakistan v India) (Partial Award) (2013) 154 ILR 1, 173 para 452. 
71 Indus Waters Kishenganga (Pakistan v India) (Final Award) (2013) 157 ILR 362, para 111. 
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‘interpretation or application’ of the Treaty but the substitution of 
customary law in place of the Treaty.72  
 
That is the danger—that other international law is ‘applied not to circumscribe, but to 
negate rights expressly granted in the Treaty’ which the court in question is entitled to 
interpret and apply. There is a lesson here for investor–State tribunals. 
Under the ECT there is no doubt as to what is the applicable law. Article 26(6) 
ECT leaves little to be desired in terms of clarity: ‘A tribunal established under 
paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and 
applicable rules and principles of international law.’73 
In proceedings conducted under the ICSID system, the picture is slightly more 
complicated: but the bottom line is to all intents and purposes the same. The applicable 
law is the BIT. ICSID Article 42(1) provides that: ‘The Tribunal shall decide a dispute 
in accordance with such rules … as may be agreed by the parties’. In most situations 
(but admittedly far from all), with a view to protecting investors’ interests against the 
vagaries of the host State’s law, the choice has been made to internationalize the 
agreement.74 This is most frequently done by making reference to international law or 
general principles of international law, possibly together with the law of the host State. 
There is a clear tendency among ICSID Tribunals to treat cases of treaty claims brought 
on the basis of BITs as involving an implicit determination on the part of the parties in 
favour of international law.75 As Christoph Schreuer has pointed out: 
                                                     
72 ibid para 112. 
73 See TW Wälde, ‘International Investment under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty—Legal, Negotiating 
and Policy Implications for Investors within Wester and Commonwealth of Independent State/Eastern 
European Countries’ (1995) 29 Journal of Wolrd Trade 5, 60. 
74 See C Schreuer et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 560. 
75 ibid 578. E.g. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Sri Lanka (1997) 4 ICSID Rep 256, paras 19–20. 
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In investment treaty arbitration, claimants regularly assert violations of the 
substantive treatment standards contained in the applicable investment 
instrument. Even in the absence of any express choice of law provisions, it is 
generally accepted that the substantive provisions of these treaties constitute the 
rules of law applicable to the dispute.76 
 
The point is that it is not for an investment tribunal to engage in ‘the substitution’ of 
EU law ‘in place of’77 the applicable law of the ECT or the BIT. That would not be 
loyal application of the applicable law of the Tribunal.  
 The question of the application of EU law in investment arbitration could also 
be conceived of as being no more than facts—this approach has been opted for in, eg, 
the EU–Vietnam78—whereby EU law is conceived of as no more than ‘relevant 
domestic law’  to be ‘take[n] into consideration, as matter of fact’. This is reminiscent 
of the holding of the Permanent Court of International Justice in Certain German 
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, to the effect that ‘[f]rom the standpoint of 
International Law and the Court which is its organ, national laws are merely facts’,79 a 
dictum the operation of which leads to several difficult problems which lie beyond the 
scope of this paper.80 
                                                     
76 C Schreuer et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 578. 
77 Indus Waters Kishenganga (Pakistan v India) (Final Award) (2013) 157 ILR 362, para 112. 
78 Art 16, EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, 1 February 2016 ('When rendering its decisions, the 
Tribunal shall apply the provisions referred to in Article 1(1) (Scope) and other provisions of this 
agreement as applicable, as well as other rules or principles of international law applicable between the 
Parties, and take into consideration, as matter of fact, any relevant domestic law of the disputing Party.’). 
79 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (1926) PCIJ Series A, No 7, 19. 
80 See e.g. CW Jenks, ‘The Interpretation and Application of Municipal Law by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice’ (1938) 19 BYIL 67; CW Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 
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Investment tribunals should not decline to take jurisdiction simply by reason of 
the annoyance that might be caused to the CJEU in the event that they do so.  
 
6. Conclusion 
As Gilbert Guillaume has observed in a different connection, in an invited amicus 
brief81 in a case before the Assemblée générale of the Conseil d’État in Kandyrine,82 
general international law does not always furnish ready answers to questions of 
seemingly concurrent treaty obligations: sometimes one has to make a choice as to 
which treaty to follow and which to breach. What applies in such situations is the 
‘Prinzip der politischen Entscheidung’—the determination may become a ‘political’ 
one. Jurisdiction before a Tribunal hearing a BIT or ECT claim can scarcely be defeated 
owing to the fact that the CJEU takes the view that, according to its authoritative 
understanding of EU law, EU law would thus be breached. For such a Tribunal the right 
political choice would be to follow its treaty, the applicable law which it is its vocation 
to apply—that is, the BIT or the ECT. EU law cannot be relied on ‘to negate rights 
expressly granted’83 in the BIT or the ECT, no more than, in the context of proceedings 
before the CJEU, a BIT or the ECT could be relied on to negate rights expressly granted 
by the Treaties of the EU—a prospect that, incidentally, the EU institutions would never 
countenance. 
 
 
                                                     
(Stevens & Sons 1964) 552; J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, 
OUP 2012) 52–54. 
81 Amicus brief of G Guillaume in (2012) 28 Revue française de droit administratif 19. 
82 Conseil d’État (2012) 28 Revue française de droit administratif 17 (conclusions: J Boucher).  
83 Indus Waters Kishenganga (Pakistan v India) (Final Award) (2013) 157 ILR 362, para 112. 
